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There appears to be very few doctrines in contemporary international law that are 
in such a problematic state as the doctrine of self-executing treaties. It would 
appear that its usefulness is more in the debate it engenders than in its actual 
relevance to understanding the interface between international law and municipal 
legal systems. This is so because the term is variously applied to different 
circumstances and ascribed with varied meanings. One of the many meanings 
ascribed to self-executing treaties is that they are treaties that apply in the 
municipal realm on their own force, discoverable from the intent of the makers as 
expressed in the language of the treaty. This article queries that understanding and 
argues that, other than by municipal law, there is no mystical authority by which 
treaties are imposed on municipal legal systems and indeed municipal courts. We 
argue that any search for the authority of treaties in the municipal realm, ultimately 
leads to municipal law as the first point of focus. 
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______________ 
Introduction 
The term “self-executing treaties” which was imported into the relationship 
between municipal law and international law by the United States Supreme 
Court in Foster v. Neilson,1 has added more confusion to an increasingly 
                                           
 Amos O. Enabulele,  PhD (Brunel University, London), LLB, LLM (Benin), BL, 
Associate Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, Faculty of Law, 
University of Benin, Nigeria; barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria.   
*  Eric Okojie, PhD (Igbinedion University, Okada), LLM (Benin),  BL, Senior Lecturer and 
Head of Department of Business Law, Faculty of Law, University of Benin, Nigeria; 
Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria.   
1 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 2 Pet. 253 253 (1829). For a detailed historical account 
see Yuji Iwasawa, (1985-1986) “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United 
States: A Critical Analysis”, 26 Virginal J. Int’l L. 627. 
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complicated area of the relationship between international law and municipal 
law.2 The confusion is manifested in variety of ways. As Riesenfeld noted:  
The acceptance and status of the doctrine of the self-executing character of 
treaties in the legal order of the United States as well as in foreign legal 
systems is both an important and intriguing problem. It has confronted the 
courts with thorny ... issues and attracted the increasing attention of scholars 
of international law. 3 
In contemporary times, the pivotal position treaties occupy, not only in the 
affairs of States, but also of both the human and non-human components of our 
globalised world, has increased the need to unravel what is meant by the terms, 
‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ treaties with a view to understanding 
the definite role they are assigned, if any, in the relationship between municipal 
law and international law.  
This article acknowledges the robust literature on the subject and argues that 
the arguments that treaties could be self-executing might be misplaced after all. 
The article argues that the concept is an abstract term that has no real practical 
bearing on the authority by which international law is applied in the municipal 
realm. This is so, insofar as it seeks to teach that a class of treaties possesses a 
magical wand by which it could transmute into the municipal realm as the law 
                                           
2 See Myres McDougal’s (1952) (Remarks) 45 Proceedings of Am. Soc’y of int’l L 101, 102  
(counselling that “this word ‘self-executing’ is essentially meaningless, and …the quicker 
we drop it from our vocabulary the better for clarity and understanding”); Andrea Bianchi, 
(2004) “International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited” 15(4) EJIL 
751, 757  (noting “the state of ‘judicial confusion’ and ‘doctrinal disarray’ to which the 
doctrine of self-execution seemed to be relegated not too long ago”); David L. Sloss, 
(2012) “Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-
Executing Treaties” 53 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 301, 311 (noting that the 
terms “self-executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ are ambiguous”); Anthony Aust, (2010)A 
Handbook of International Law, (Cambridge University Press) 79, (noting that “the self-
executing concept has led to considerable confusion and uncertainty”); Jordan J. Paust, 
(1988) “Self-Executing Treaties”, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 760, 768; Robert E. Dalton (2006) 
(Remarks) “Judicial Enforcement of Treaties: Self-Execution and Related Doctrines”,100 
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 439, 442, (observing that “when one looks at the literature and 
considers the practice, it is clear that ‘self-executing’ has become an ambiguous term 
devoid of generally accepted meaning”); Edward T. Swaine (2008) “Taking Care of 
Treaties” 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331, 353 (observing that “non-self-executing treaties [is] a 
label used in maddeningly inconsistent ways”); David Sloss, (1999) “The Domestication 
of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights 
Treaties” 24 Yale J. Int'l L. 129, 131 (noting the multiple meanings and ambiguity of the 
term ‘self-executing treaty’). 
3 Stefan A. Riesenfeld, (1973) “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and Community 
Law; A Pioneer Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Community” 67 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 504, 504. 
Myths and Realities in ‘Self Executing Treaties’                                                                       3 
 
 
of the realm without an enabling municipal law in the form of a general 
constitutional provision or specific legislative implementation. The paper also 
argues that the bulk of literature ascribing super-norm value to the so called 
‘self-executing treaties’ is based on a false generalisation of the approach of 
courts of the United States (US) and that, in actual fact, not even in the US is 
there any such class of treaties capable of municipal application on their own 
force.4 The paper concludes that the supposition that there is a class of treaties 
that is ‘self-executing’ in the sense that it does not require any form of 
municipal law enabler is a myth that has made this area of international law 
really messy.  
The first part of this article discusses the concept of self-executing treaties. 
The second part examines the confusion attendant upon seeking to read the 
concept into dissimilar constitutional provisions to those of the US. The third 
part seeks to understand when it can actually be said that a treaty is self-
executing, and the last part considers the role to be ascribed to the intent of 
treaty matters.  
1. The Concept of Self-Executing Treaties 
Although this essentially American concept of ‘self-executing treaties’ was not 
used by the US Supreme Court until 1887, when Field J., used the term in 
Bartram v. Robertson,5 it is generally agreed that the concept actually arose 
from Chief Justice Marshall’s view in Foster v. Neilson, wherein he declared 
that there is a class of treaties that “is carried into execution ... whenever it 
operates of itself”,6 notwithstanding that it was not even used in the case.7 
                                           
4 Ernest A. Young (2007) “Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law”,  120 
Harvard Law Review Forum, 28, 34 (doubting “whether it is correct to say that U.S. courts 
ever applied international law ‘of its own force’”); Lori F. Damrosch, (1991) “Role of the 
United States Senate Concerning Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties - United 
States”, 67 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 515, 516 (noting that the basic distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties under US law is not beyond question or criticism 
and that it is essentially a judicial one, created by the courts to govern their own role with 
respect to treaties). 
5 124 US 190 (1887); Contra: Sloss, “The Domestication” supra, note 2, p. 146 (stating that 
the earliest use of the term ‘self-executing’ in the sense of requiring implementing 
legislation appears to have been in Whitney v. Robertson 124 U.S. 190 (1888)) It is 
however instructive to state that both cases were decided by Field J., who actually cited 
Bartram v. Robertson in Whitney v. Robertson.  
6 Foster, supra note 1. 
7 See Malvina Halberstam, (2005) “Alvarez-Machain II: The Supreme Court's reliance on 
the Non-Self-Executing Declaration in the Senate Resolution Giving Advice and Consent 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 89, 
96  (arguing that “[a]lthough the proposition that in the United States treaties may be either 
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In Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the 
effect upon perfected private land titles of the phrase “shall be ratified and 
confirmed to those in possession”, which appeared in article 8 of the Treaty of 
Amity, Settlements and Limits between the US and the King of Spain, of 
February 22, 1819. Justice Marshall reasoned that as the language was that of 
contract, the article required legislative implementation before the titles could be 
assured to their possessors. Marshall made the following statement that has now 
translated to self-executing and non-self-executing treaties: 
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, 
consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whatever it operates of itself without the aid any legislative 
provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract – when 
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses 
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court.8 
In United States v. Percheman,9 while considering the Spanish version of the 
same provision, the Marshall’s court took a different view, holding that although 
the words “shall be ratified and confirmed” are properly the words of a contract, 
stipulating for some future legislative act,10 they are not necessarily so, as they 
may import that they “shall be ratified and confirmed” by force of the 
instrument itself.11 In effect, the instrument was held to be self-executing in 
Percheman but non-self-executing in Foster. In rationalising the conflicting 
decisions in the cases, the court explained that the Spanish version of the treaty 
was not brought into view in Foster and that it was then supposed there was no 
variance between them.12 
                                                                                                            
self-executing or non-self-executing is generally attributed to Chief Justice Marshall's 
decision in Foster &  v. Neilson, the terms ‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ do not 
even appear in the opinion”); Penny M. Venetis, “Making Human Rights Treaty Law 
Actionable in the United States: The case for Universal Implementing Legislation”, 63(1) 
Alabama Law Review, 97 (noting that although the term “self-execution” was not formally 
used until 1887, the theory was elaborated upon by Justice Marshall in Foster v. Nielson). 
It would, however, appear Justice Marshall was influenced by Justice Iredell’s 
classification of treaties into ‘executed’ and ‘executory’ in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 274 
(1796). 
8 Foster, supra note 1, p. 314.  
9 United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 51, 89 (1833). 
10 Id., p.  88-89. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Id., p. 89; Stotter has however argued that the two cases are compatible since both were 
based on the same constitutional theory of separation of power, which prevented Marshall 
from considering the treaty as self-executing in Foster, but that separation of power posed 
no problem in Percheman due to the clarity of the treaty provisions – Charles W. Stotter, 
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The summary of the approach of the court in the cases was: if it could be 
collected from the language of the treaty that the parties intended it to operate 
within municipal sphere on its own force without the enablement of municipal 
law, the treaty would pass for a self-executing treaty – Percheman.  Otherwise, 
it would require a national legislation to give it effect – Foster. Though it seems 
the decisive factor on these occasions was the language of the treaty, we argue 
that a careful analysis would clearly show that the decisive factor was the 
provision of the US Constitution. 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the United States are in article 
VI, which provides: 
This constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The views to be expressed hereafter concerning these provisions are not aimed 
at supplanting or even resolving the opposing interpretations the provisions have 
received but to emphasise the view also shared by many American scholars, that 
the American Constitution and not treaties belies the patently irreconcilable 
views on the application of treaties in the United States.13 We simply seek to 
                                                                                                            
(1975-1976) (Comment) “Self-Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of 
the United Nations Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem”, 25 Buff. L. Rev. 773, 775. 
13 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, (2008) “Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy 
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties”, 122 HARV. L. Rev. 599, 602, 606, 
(arguing that the Supremacy Clause renders treaties, like statutes and the Constitution, 
presumptively enforceable in U.S. courts); Martin S. Flaherty, (1999) “History Right?: 
Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the 
Land”, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095  (arguing that the prevailing view that the Founders 
intended treaties to be self-executing is supported by history, in particular the text of the 
Supremacy Clause; the votes and debates at the Constitutional Convention; and 
ratification evidence); Zechariah Chafee Jr.,(1951-1952) “Amending the Constitution to 
Cripple Treaties” 12 Louisiana L. Rev. 345, 356-357 (noting the existing US 
constitutional principle, by which most American treaties are self-executing and that 
article VI renders treaties binding on every state judge and that a treaty will usually take 
effect automatically in the United States as no act of Congress is required to implement 
it.); Quincy Wright, (1916) “The Legal Nature of Treaties”, 10 Am. J. Int’l L. 706, 719 
(arguing that “[t]he Government of the United States presumes that whenever a treaty has 
been duly concluded and ratified by the acknowledged authorities competent for that 
purpose, an obligation is thereby imposed upon each and every department of the 
Government to carry it into complete effect, according to its terms…”); Leonie W. 
Huang, (2011) “Which Treaties Reign Supreme? The Dormant Supremacy Clause Effect 
of Implemented Non-Self-Executing Treaties”, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2211, 2213-2214  
(arguing that “[a] plain reading of the first part of the Supremacy Clause implies that 
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emphasise that the primary focus of US Courts, albeit latent in some cases, has 
always been the Constitution and not treaties. 
In our view, the language of article VI provides sufficient scope for the 
conclusion that “so long as treaties and laws remain in full force ... the judicial 
power can exercise no discretion in refusing to give effect to those laws … 
unless they shall be deemed unconstitutional”.14 This supports the view that “a 
treaty ... by the express words of the constitution, is the supreme law of the land, 
binding alike National and state Courts… and must be enforced by them …”.15 
These confirm the view that a validly made treaty to which the US is a party is 
generally16 applicable in the US as the “law of the land”, without the need for an 
implementing legislation.17 This has the correct construction of article VI for 
                                                                                                            
‘Treaties’ are, by themselves, the ‘supreme Law of the Land’ in the same way as the 
‘Constitution’ and statutory ‘Laws of the United States.” And that “[t]he clause does not 
say that a treaty needs a ‘Law of the United States’ to be” the supreme law); Halberstam,  
“Alvarez-Machain II”, supra, note 7, p. 96 (arguing that the history of article VI “makes 
clear that the Framers intended treaties to have immediate effect as domestic law and to 
be interpreted and applied by the courts ‘like all other laws”); Phillip R. Trimble (1985-
1986) “A Revisionist View of Customary International Law” 33 UCLA L. Rev. 665, 676 
(arguing that the supremacy clause provides a constitutional basis for the application of 
treaties as the law of the United States);  Michael John Garcia, “International Law and 
Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S.” January 23, 2014 Congressional Research Service 
7-5700 <www.crs.gov> RL32528, p. 8. Contra: John C. Yoo, (1999) “Globalism and the 
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self Execution, and the Original Understanding”, 99 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1955, (supporting a presumption of non-self-execution on the grounds that neither 
the Supremacy Clause nor its history indicate that the status of a treaty as the supreme law 
of the land was to be achieved through direct judicial enforcement, and that non-self-
execution allows the political branches necessary discretion to conduct foreign policy – p. 
1971); John C. Yoo, “Treaties and Public Law making: A Textual and Structural Defense 
of Non-Self Execution”, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2236 (expressing the fear that “[i]f the 
United States forges multilateral agreements addressing problems that were once 
domestic in scope, treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for domestic regulation”. 
He further argued (at p. 2237) that “[m]aking treaties self-executing [could] create a 
potentially limitless executive power”); David H. Moore (2009) “Law (Makers) of the 
Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 122, 32, 
33. 
14 Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S (6 Pet) 515, 593 (1832). 
15 Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S 268, 272-73 (1909). 
16  There are always certain classes of treaties that cannot be applicable in a domestic order 
without domestic legislation irrespective of whether the domestic order is monist or 
dualist in nature. Examples are treaties requiring alteration of domestic law, treaties 
imposing financial burden on the State, etc.  
17 In Ware v. Hylton, supra, note 7, the court directly applied the 1783 Peace Treaty 
between the US and Britain). The same approach prevailed in Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 454, 456–57 (1806); The Paquete Habana 175 US 677, 700 (1900). Also see 
Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 340 (C.C.D.N.C 1792) (Case No. 5, 980) p. 764 
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there to have been several attempts directed towards amending it to make 
implementing legislation mandatory. The much discussed Bricker Draft 
Amendment18 and the American Bar Association proposal19 are examples of 
such failed attempts.  
The practice by which the US Senate accompanies treaty ratification with 
“non-self-executing” declarations would be an expensive waste of time had the 
US Constitution required implementing legislation for a treaty to create 
municipally enforceable rights in the US. A treaty negotiated by the executive 
branch requires a two-thirds majority of the US Senate for it to be binding on 
the US. The US Senate has often exercised its power in the treaty making 
process, not only to reject treaties, but also to circumscribe the domestic 
application of ratified treaties through the machinery of reservations, 
understandings and declarations (RUDS). By accompanying ratification with a 
‘non-self-executing’ declaration, the US Senate effectively blocks the application 
of a ratified treaty as a ‘law of the land’ through the constitutionally prescribed 
treaty making procedures by subjecting it to further legislative scrutiny 
involving the House of Representatives. Accordingly, a “treaty deemed non-
self-executing would first require the consent of two-thirds of the US Senate and 
a second round of consent by a majority of both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives”.20 
                                                                                                            
(declaring that a treaty, “being ratified and made ... became a complete national act and 
law of every state”.) United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) 
(Chief Justice Marshall affirming that “[i]f the law [a treaty] be constitutional .... I know 
of no court which can contest its obligation”).   
18 Sloss, “Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 173 (stating that the ‘Bricker Amendment’ 
refers to a series of proposals for constitutional amendments, several of which were 
sponsored by Senator John Bricker, attempting, in different ways, to limit the domestic 
legal effects of treaties and other international agreements. Also see Chafee, supra, note 
13, 350; Damos Dumoli Agusman (2013-2014) “Self-Executing and Non Self Executing 
Treaties what does it Mean?” 11 Indonesian J. Int'l L. 320. 
19 Chafee, supra note 13, p. 356. 
20 Huang, supra note 13, p. 2223; Louis Henkin, (1996) Foreign Affairs and the U.S. 
Constitution, 202 (2d ed.) (noting that RUDs are “anti-Constitutional’ in spirit and highly 
problematic as a matter of law”); Thomas Buergenthal, (1997) “Modem Constitutions and 
Human Rights Treaties”, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 211, 221, 222 (arguing that “it may 
seriously be doubted” that “the non-self-executing declaration is constitutional” and that 
the “U.S. declarations making human rights treaties non-self-executing are ill advised and 
probably unconstitutional”); Lori Fisler Damrosch, (1991) “The Role of the United States 
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and ‘Non-Self- Executing’ Treaties”, 67 Chi.-Kentl. 
Rev. 515, 599 ( arguing that “[a] Senate declaration purporting to negate the legal effect 
of otherwise self-executing treaty provisions is constitutionally questionable as a 
derogation from the ordinary application of Article VI of the Constitution”); Louis 
Henkin, (1995) “U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
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Instead, therefore, of the monist21 approach of the US Constitution,22 the 
classification of treaties as non-self-executing appears to be the dominant 
practice of the US Senate.23  Nevertheless, rather than weaken, the very act of 
expressly declaring a treaty as ‘non-self-executing,’ the non-self-executing 
                                                                                                            
Bricker”,89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341, 348 (stating that “[t]he pattern of non-self-executing 
declarations threatens to subvert the constitutional treaty system”); Louis Henkin, (1997) 
“Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?” 91 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 
Proc., 517, 517 (noting that self-executing declarations constitute an application of “the 
transformation-dualist approach” which is against the monist construction of Article VI of 
the United States constitution); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, (1991) “The 
Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties”,67 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev.571, 599; (arguing that “[a]n ancillary power of the Senate to deny self-
execution directly contradicts” the intent the framers of the Constitution that treaties be 
given direct effect in U.S. law…”); Halberstam, “Alvarez-Machain II”, supra, note 7, p. 
98 (arguing that the proposition that a treaty cannot be enforced by the courts because the 
President or Senate declares that it is not self-executing …is inconsistent with the view 
expressed by Marshall” and “clearly contravenes the command of the Constitution that all 
treaties are the supreme law of the land and the judges of every state shall be bound 
thereby”); Charles H. Dearborn II, (1979) (Note), “The Domestic Legal Effect of 
Declarations That Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing”,57 Tex. L. Rev. 233, 233-
234 (arguing that "declarations [making a treaty non-self-executing] are of dubious 
validity"); Malvina Halberstam, (1997) “United States Ratification of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women”,31 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l 
L. & Econ,49. Contra: Carlos Manuel Vázquez, (1999) “Laughing at Treaties” 99, (8) 
Columbia Law Review, 2154, 2174, (though stating that “[t]he doctrine as reflected in … 
[non-self-executing] declarations is clearly in tension with the Supremacy Clause's text”, 
he did not consider the declarations to be illegal. To him, if the Senate can make treaties 
non-self-executing, then “[t]he Supremacy Clause becomes a default rule, subject to 
reversal through the acts of the treaty makers”). 
21 Monism holds that municipal law and international law belong to a single order in which 
international law is supreme. Monism is patterned after the direct application of 
international law in the municipal realm without the need of legislative incorporation.   
22 CF. Louis Henkin (1986-1987) “The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny”, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 868 (noting that 
the U.S Constitution did not indicate a predominantly monist disposition); Sloss, 
“Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 148 (arguing that the automatic incorporation of 
treaties into the U.S domestic law does not necessarily mean that judges can rely on them 
to provide a rule of decision in a case). 
23 Trimble, supra, note 13, p. 677 (expressing the reluctance of U.S courts to enjoin federal 
executive officials from a treaty violation by holding the treaty to be "non-self-
executing,"); Henkin “The Constitution”, ibid, p. 870 (observing that it is unlikely that the 
U.S. Supreme Court would subordinate the Constitution to the law of nations and give 
effect to a principle of international law without regard to constitutional constraints and 
that the Court's jurisprudence about treaties places the United States outside the strict 
monist camp).  
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stipulations strengthen the argument that the US Constitution is monist in 
nature.   
In spite of the diversity of application of the text of article VI and the judicial 
decisions thereon, the constitutional rule is that treaties are generally directly 
applicable in the US and that the concept of ‘non-self-execution’ is an exception 
to this general rule.24 It could also be seen that this constitutional rule has been 
circumscribed and made doubtful by the judiciary in respect of some treaties and 
by the Senate in respect of others. The notion of self-execution through a 
distinction between treaties that are effective by the force of the language used 
and those that are not is one of the many devices the courts have so far 
deployed.25 Nevertheless, the US Courts appear convinced that their role is not 
to deny that treaties are the laws of the land as per the Constitution; this 
necessarily limits their roles to deciding whether ordinarily applicable treaties 
require any post-ratification legislative or executive action to give them proper 
effect. In totality, it could be asserted that the US Constitution is monist in 
theory but potentially or semi monist in practice. 
2. Made in the US – Not Suitable for Export 
If the doctrine of ‘self-execution’ has complicated article VI of the US 
Constitution and made its true import perpetually difficult to grasp after over 
two Centuries of its existence, it goes without saying that States importing the 
                                           
24 Paust, “Self-Executing Treaties”, supra,note 2,  p. 774. 
25 Paust, ibid p. 760 (arguing that “[t]he distinction found in certain cases between "self-
executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently 
inconsistent with express language in the Constitution…" and that “such a distinction 
may involve the most glaring of attempts to deviate from the specific text of the 
Constitution”); Carlos M. Vazquez, (2006)(Introductory Remarks) “Judicial Enforcement 
of Treaties: Self-Execution and Related Doctrines” 100 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 439 
(stating that “the concept of a non-self-executing treaty masks several distinct types of 
reasons why a treaty might not be judicially enforceable even though it is the "supreme 
Law of the Land”); Stotter, supra note 12, 773(noting that despite the constitutional grant 
of supremacy, the operation of treaties as domestic law has been judicially 
circumscribed); Vázquez, “Laughing at Treaties”, supra, note 20, p. 2175 (arguing that 
the “declaration that treaties have the force of domestic law remains the default rule … 
But judicial precedent requires, at most, the acceptance of a power to countermand the 
ordinary operation of the Supremacy Clause”). For examples of the application of the 
non-self-executing device, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Postal  
589F.2d862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979); Correctional Services Corp v. Malesko, 53, U.S 68 
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S 275, 286-287 (2001). 
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concept stand to share in the congenital disease of imprecision that it carries.26 
Its imprecision, notwithstanding, ‘self-execution’ has readily been read into 
monist constitutions27 with even the very rare, if not strange, example of section 
234(1) of the South African Constitution, 1996,28 which expressly adopted the 
doctrine. Essentially, Section 231(4) provides: 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted 
into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an 
agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless 
it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
As recognised by South African scholars, the major difficulty with copying “this 
essentially American doctrine”29 which flows from the disparate understanding 
of the term ‘self-executing’, is that the constitution failed to pinpoint which of 
the various understanding of the term is intended to govern its application as a 
constitutional rule.30 
It is thus difficult to comprehend the role the Constitution assigns to ‘self-
execution’ in the pre-existing case law represented by Pan American Airways 
Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co Ltd31 line of cases. Is self-
                                           
26 Riesenfeld, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and Community Law”, supra,  note 
3,p. 504 (noting that the acceptance and status of the doctrine of self-executing character 
of treaties in the legal order of the US as well as in foreign legal systems is both an 
important and intriguing problem).   
27 Yuji Iwasawa (1997) “International Law in the Japanese Legal Order: Recent 
Developments” 91 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law, 301, 303  (observing that, “Japanese scholars have recognized the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties since the 1950s” and 
that “Japanese courts have been using the term self-executing since 1985”); Stefan A. 
Riesenfeld,(1971) “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and Gatt: A Notable German 
Judgment”, 65(3) Proceedings of Am. J. Int’l L, 548, 548  (noting the application of the 
“self-executing” concept in Germany). 
28 Effective from 4 February, 1997. It would appear that these provisions substantially 
altered the similar provisions of the interim constitution of 1993. See Dermott J. Devine, 
(1995) “The Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law in the Light of 
the Interim South African Constitution 1993”, 44 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 1. 
29 John Dugard, (1994) International Law: A South African Perspective 345 cited in Nevile 
Botha (1997) “Treaties After 1996: More Questions than Answers”, 22 S. Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 
95, 99. 
30 Andre Stemmet , “A future African Court for Human and People's Rights”, 23 S. Afr. Y.B. 
Int'l L. 233, 244 (1998) (noting that “a measure of uncertainty exists about the definition 
of a self-executing agreement in South African law”) George N Barrie, (1995) “Self-
Executing v Non-Self-Executing Treaties: The Confusion Continues”, J. S. Afr. L. 368, 
370 (referring to the “confusing jurisprudence in the United States over the difference 
between self-executing treaties…and non-self-executing treaties”). 
311965 3 SA. 
Myths and Realities in ‘Self Executing Treaties’                                                                       11 
 
 
execution to be understood to permit the application of unincorporated treaties32 
or is it to operate within the already established paradigm of incorporation? Pan 
American Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co Ltd 
represent the “general rule [that] the provisions of a treaty are not embodied in 
the municipal law except by legislative process” and that they cannot, in the 
absence of any enactment giving them the force of law, affect the rights of the 
subject.33 
While the first limb of the provision did not substantially deviate from the 
pre-existing practice of incorporation as represented by Pan American Airways 
Incorporated, the second limb maps out an opposite gateway that potentially 
opens up the South African legal system to the application of more treaty 
provisions than the Pan American Airways Incorporated principle could admit. 
This becomes even clearer when the second limb of article 231(4) is read 
together with article 231(2), which specifies that an international agreement 
binds the republic upon “approval by resolution of both the national assembly 
and the national provinces…”. Together, these provisions make ‘self-executing’ 
provisions in all treaties that are binding upon South Africa automatically 
applicable without incorporation, by obviating the second parliamentary action 
required for treaties to be domestically applicable under the first limb of 231(4). 
Importantly, the parliamentary resolution required in section 231(2) must 
accompany all treaties that are binding on South Africa and this is different from 
the legislative action required to give treaties municipal application in the first 
limb of 231(4). According to Botha, section 231(4) provides not merely for the 
automatic application of self-executing treaties as a whole, but also for the 
automatic application of any 'self-executing provision' in a treaty, and thus 
opens “the door not only to the piecemeal application of treaty provisions, but 
also to the application of certain provisions of an unincorporated treaty”.34 
It would appear, however, like article VI of the US Constitution, that section 
231 provisions are not such that can be successfully explained on the bare letters 
of the South African Constitution, the best explanation would await what 
practice the legislature and the courts make of them. In drawing an analogy 
between the US and South Africa, it is important to state that the ‘self-
executing’ concept cannot be utilised in South Africa in the same way that it 
                                           
32 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (holding 
that no domestic legislation is required to give being self-executing treaties the force of 
law in the United States. 
33 Ibid, p. 150A; Maluleke v Minister of InternalAffairs1981 1 SA 707, 712(H)(BSC) 
(holding that “if legislation is passed to give effect to a treaty, that will be the source of a 
citizen's rights”). 
34 Botha, supra, note 29, p. 99; Christa Roodt (1987-1988) “National Law and Treaties: An 
Overview” 13 S. Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 72, 99. 
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could be applied in the US. This is because the US Constitution declares treaties 
to be the law of the land, thus giving all treaties entered into by the US a 
potential domestic force. The absence of a similar provision in South Africa 
makes it less likely for South African courts to be called upon to enforce just 
any treaty that is binding on South Africa and this of course also makes it less 
likely for the courts to utilise the second limb of section 231(4) to hold that an 
incorporated treaty is applicable as a ‘self-executing’ treaty.  
The self-executing argument has also accompanied article 15(4) of the 1993 
Russian Constitution, which provides: 
The universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part 
of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian 
Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied. 
Speaking of this provision, Danilenko described “the emerging Russian concept 
of directly applicable or self-executing treaties”.35 In fairness to that view, when 
taken in isolation, article 15(4) bears a certain similarity with article VI of the 
US constitution as it opens a broad gateway to the passage of treaties into the 
Russian Federation. This is, however, countermanded by article 15(3) which 
makes the application of all laws, without exception, conditional upon 
publication. Article 15(3) thus obviates the need for nationalist judges and 
scholars to find the notion of ‘self-execution’ handy for the restriction of the 
article 15(4) treaty highway for the purpose of “turn[ing] …[the] monistic state 
into a dualistic one”.36 
The requirement of publication, which usually features in monist 
constitutions, provides a safety valve which is lacking in the US Constitution 
and for which reason, the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties, has understandably been resorted to in the US.  
It is thus arguable that a judge can safely refuse to recognise and apply the 
monist article 15(4) to “international treaties and agreements of the Russian 
Federation”… [as] a component part of its legal system”, unless and until such a 
treaty is published in compliance with article 15(3). It should thus be supposed 
that the requirement of publication, does for the Russian Federation, what the 
notion of ‘non-self-execution’ does for the United States –it gives the Federation 
the opportunity to either publish the treaty as it is or to simply reproduce the 
treaty provision in a legislative instrument. Pending publication, there would 
also be the opportunity to undertake necessary legal reforms to eliminate any 
                                           
35 Gennady M. Danilenko, (1997) “International Law in the Russian Legal System” 91 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 295, 298. 
36 Id., p. 298. 
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incompatibility that may have otherwise arisen, or adopt legislation, when 
necessary. The question is not whether treaties are directly applicable under the 
constitution, for they are; it is whether they have municipal force of law.37 
In view of the points we have just made concerning the requirement of 
publication, it is arguable whether –as claimed by Preuss– article 26 of the 
French Constitution, 1946, is “[t]he most familiar example of a recent 
constitution providing expressly for self-executing treaties”.38 Article 26 
provides that: 
Diplomatic treaties duly ratified and published shall have the force of law 
even when they are contrary to internal French legislation; they shall require 
for their application no legislative acts other than those necessary to insure 
their ratification.39 
To argue that this provision, which is the avant garde of monist constitutions 
and after which many constitutions are modelled,40 expressly enacts self-
executing treaties is not to give sufficient attention to the fact that ‘self-
execution’ is an artificial judicial device employed to negate the monistic 
provision of article VI of the US Constitution. Our observation was even 
confirmed by Preuss, who, while commenting further on article 26 of the French 
Constitution, argued that “[i]nstances in which treaties might in the United 
States be non-self-executing, suffice to integrate the treaty into the internal legal 
order of France”.41 To read ‘self-execution’ into the French constitution, 
therefore, is to deny that constitution its most essential attribute as the 
forerunner of monism.  
Danilenko’s view of the Russian Constitution, section 231(4) of the South 
African Constitution and Preuss’ view of the French Constitution are examples 
of attempts to clothe Marshall’s ideal of ‘self-execution’ with an aura of 
generality for which it is not suited. This can only further distort the 
                                           
37 Iwasawa, “International Law in the Japanese”, supra, note 27, p. 303  (arguing that the 
question “[w]hether international law can be directly applied in domestic law should be 
distinguished from whether international law has the force of law in domestic law”) 
38 Lawrence Preuss, (1953) “On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative 
Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties” 51 Michigan Law Review, 1117, 1124. 
39 This has now been replaced by article 55of the Constitution of October 4, 1958, which 
provides that “[t]reaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, 
prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its 
application by the other party”, which is merely a more precise version that is 
substantially the same as article 26 of the 1946 Constitution.  
40 See article 222 of the Constitution of the Republic of Chad, 1996; article 116 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Mali, 1992; article 147 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Benin, 1990; etc.  
41 Preuss, supra note 38, p. 1126. 
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understanding of the constitutional context of its application in the US and 
create more confusion for non-US practitioners. In view of this, Paust accused 
legal commentators of distorting Marshall’s meaning and creating “tests 
concerning self-executing and non-self-executing treaties that are patently 
inconsistent with the text of the [US] constitution ... and earlier judicial 
opinions”.42   
One of the grounds on which the theory of ‘self-executing’ treaties have been 
extended beyond the US domestic sphere is on a flexible  interpretation of the 
decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Danzig.43  Noting the impropriety of taking 
Marshall’s approach out of its natural habitat – the US Constitution – Iwasawa 
directly placed the blame upon European scholars, whom he seems to accuse of 
misunderstanding the term ‘self-executing treaties’ to mean treaties which create 
individual rights that are enforceable in national courts. He argued that the 
concept of self-executing treaties underwent a conceptual transformation when 
it was embraced by European scholars as a result of their reliance on 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Danzig.44 
In the Danzig case, the PCIJ held –respecting the Danzig-Polish Agreement, 
made pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles of 1919– that “the very object of an 
international agreement … may be the adoption by the parties of some definite 
rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by national 
courts”.45 The dispute was between Poland and the Free City of Danzig 
established pursuant to article 100 of the Versailles Treaty. The opinion of the 
PCIJ was sought respecting the interpretation of the “Beamtenabkommen”, 
                                           
42 Paust, “Self-Executing”, note 2, p. 768. See p. 767 for Paust’s interpretation of Marshall’s 
view of self-executing treaties.  
43 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928, PCIJ 
Series B, No. 15 (Judgment of March 3). 
44 Ibid; Iwasawa, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States” supra note 
1, pp. 631 646 and 650 (the writer also accused European scholars of “laboring under the 
continuing influence of the Danzig...” decision). See Richard Plender, (1983) “The 
European Court as an International Tribunal”, 42(2), Cambridge Law Journal, 279, 287, 
(observing the insufficient appreciation that Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU)) sub silentio derived “the doctrine of direct effects (or direct applicability)” from 
the PCIJ and that the CJEU had “in its celebrated judgment in Van Gend en Loos, 
followed the reasoning and even adopted some of the language of the Advisory Opinion 
in the Danzig Railway Officials case”); Jack Solomon, (1951-1952) (Note) “When Are 
Treaties Self-Executing?” 31 Neb. L. Rev. 463, 473-474  (arguing that the test of intent 
developed in the US concerning article VI of the Constitution, seems to be the same as 
the test utilized by the PCIJ in the Danzig case and that the PCIJ held that “the treaty was 
intended to be self-executing”). 
45 Danzig, supra note 43, pp. 17-18.  
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which was a treaty between Poland and Danzig for the regulation of conditions 
of work for officials employed by the Polish Railways Administration in 
Danzig. The question before the PCIJ was whether individuals could, based on 
the provisions of the treaty, pursue a private claim before the courts of the Free 
City of Danzig. Poland had argued that the Beamtenabkommen, being an 
international agreement, created rights and obligations between the contracting 
Parties only, and that failing its incorporation into Polish national legislation, the 
Beamtenabkommen cannot create direct rights or obligations for the individuals 
concerned. In consequence, Poland argued that if it failed to respect its 
international obligations arising under the Beamtenabkommen, it is responsible 
only to the Free City of Danzig and not to the individual claimants before the 
courts of Danzig.46 
The PCIJ held that a treaty “cannot, as such, create direct rights and 
obligations for private individuals” but that such a right could be created if it 
was the intention of the parties so to create. Therefore, the court reasoned that 
the “wording and general tenor of the Beamtenabkommen show that its 
provisions are directly applicable as between the officials and the 
Administration” of the Polish Railway.47 
It is possible to misunderstand the reasoning of the court in this case and thus 
wrongly use it as a substratum for the acceptance of the concept of self-
executing treaties outside the parameters of its creation in the US. On a closer 
look, however, one cannot but come to the inevitable conclusion that the 
Beamtenabkommen presented peculiarities which are hardly shared by 
contemporary international agreements. Its peculiarities were the decisive 
factors for the decision of the court. It is thus essential to consider the decision 
of the court in the light of the finding that the Beamtenabkommen was not just 
an international agreement between Poland and Danzig but (most importantly) 
that it formed “part of the special regulations which govern the relations 
between the Polish Railways Administration and the officials concerned”.48 In 
fact, the court accepted that the Beamtenabkommen constituted part of their 
“contract of service”. It was this finding that gave the railway officers the right 
to litigate the provisions of the treaty before the courts of Danzig.49 They were 
thus litigating the terms of the treaty as incorporated into their contract of 
service. 
The Danzig case cannot be used to justify the existence of the concept of 
self-executing treaties outside the monist line of thought that governed 
                                           
46 Id., p. 17. 
47 Id., p. 18. 
48 Id., p. 20. 
49 Id., p. 21. 
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Marshall’s approach in Foster. Besides, we only need to remind ourselves of the 
numerous treaty instruments intended, not only to create private rights but also 
to be effective municipally, and of which no one is under any illusion that they 
can be applied without a municipal law stipulation to that effect. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
testify to the shaky foundation of such vigorous interpretation of the Danzig 
case. Though crafted to benefit individuals, these covenants are not ascribed 
with a self-executing character. There is no doubt that States have the faculty to 
enter into treaties with the intention to create private rights which are capable of 
enforcement by private parties in their courts,50 the pertinent question is always 
whether that capability is activated by state parties in their municipal law in any 
particular case.  
Only recently, the ICJ refused to give credence to this supposed notion of 
‘self-execution’ that seeks to enforce international law in the municipal realm 
independent of municipal law. This was in Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals.51  In this case, Mexico brought an Application instituting proceedings 
against the United States of America for “violations of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations” (VCCR) of 24 April 1963.  
It was the case of Mexico that the United States, in arresting, detaining, 
trying, convicting, and sentencing 54 Mexican nationals to death, violated its 
international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of 
its right of consular protection of its nationals, as provided for in articles 5 and 
36, respectively, of the VCCR. As a consequence, Mexico claimed, inter alia, 
restitutio in integrum and restoration of status quo ante, by re-establishing the 
situation that existed before the detention, trial, convictions and sentencing of 
the Mexican nationals in violation of the United States international legal 
obligations. 
In its decision, the ICJ held that the United States was in breach of its 
international obligation towards Mexico under the VCCR for failing to notify 
the appropriate Mexican consular post of the detention of the Mexican nationals 
and thereby depriving Mexico of the right to render the assistance provided for 
by the VCCR to the individuals concerned.52 The court directed the US to 
“provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the 
conviction and sentence, so as to allow full weight to be given to the violation of 
the rights set forth in the Convention”.53 
                                           
50 Head Money case, 112 U.S 580, 598 (1884). 
51 (Mexico v.United States of America), ICJ Rep.2004, 12, 36, para 40. 
52 Id., p. 71, para 153 (4) and (5). 
53 Id., p. 72, para 153(9). 
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In one of the consequential proceedings at the Supreme Court of the United 
States –Medellin v. Texas54– the court refused to implement the ICJ judgment 
and Medellin was executed. Upon the failure of the Mexican citizens to obtain 
reprieve through judicial means in the US, Mexico returned to the ICJ in 
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case 
concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,55 wherein Mexico sought an 
interpretation of the judgment with a view to showing that the failure of the US 
Supreme Court to enforce the earlier judgment56 was a violation of the 
obligation on the US to comply with the judgment of the court under article 
94(1) of the United Nations Charter.  
In its arguments in the proceedings on Request for Interpretation,57 Mexico 
argued that the United States had an obligation of result under paragraph 153(9) 
of the earlier judgment and that the United States must provide review and 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentencing of the Mexican Nationals.58 
The United States argued that the question as to whether or not ICJ judgments 
could be treated as authoritative for US courts was strictly a matter of United 
States domestic law.  
In its decision, though finding that the execution of Medellin was a clear 
breach of its judgment in the main Avena case, the court reasoned that: 
The Avena Judgment nowhere lays down or implies that the courts in the 
United States are required to give direct effect to paragraph 153(9)…,  the 
judgment leaves it to the United States to choose the means of 
implementation, not excluding the introduction within a reasonable time of an 
appropriate legislation, if deemed necessary under domestic constitutional 
law. Nor moreover does the Avena judgment prevent direct enforceability of 
the obligation in question, if such an effect is permitted by domestic law.59 
                                           
54 Medellín v. Texas, (2008), Supreme Court Reporter, Vol. 128, 2008, 1346; Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 US 331 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (rejecting the argument that 
international tribunal judgments have direct domestic effect, the Supreme Court held that 
the available remedies for violation of international law was a question of domestic law. 
Also, that the ICJ decisions can neither compel it to reconsider its understanding of the 
VCCR Convention nor dictate domestic court opinions); CF Swaine, supra, note 2, p. 
378-379 (while arguing that the United States is obligated as a matter of international law 
to adhere to the decision of the ICJ under article 94 of the Charter, noted that the article 
seems to fall comfortably within the category of non-self-executing obligations). 
55 (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Rep, 2009, 3. 
56 Avena case, supra, note 51. 
57 Supra, note 55. 
58 Id., p. 6, para 9. 
59 Id., p 17, para 44. 
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In other words, notwithstanding that the judgment affirmed the rights of the 
affected Mexican nationals to receive nullification of their earlier trial for 
violation of Mexican’s right to consular representation, and notwithstanding that 
the requirement of consular representation in the VCCR was made with the 
intention of benefiting nationals of the parties to the Convention, both the US 
Supreme Court and the ICJ could be seen to have come to the same conclusion 
that the true test of the municipal effect of the Avena judgment is located within 
the law of US. Interestingly, the US Supreme Court simply based its view in 
Medellin on the reasoning that article 94 of the United Nations Charter, which 
underpinned the authoritative force of the judgment for States, is not self-
executing in the US.60 
Having shown that Danzig cannot be the basis for generalising self-execution 
and exporting it to every monist legal system –to furnish consideration for the 
argument that treaties creating individual rights are self-executing in the sense 
of applying as municipal law on their own force–61 we shall now seek to 
understand what self-execution actually means.  
3. When is a Treaty Self-Executing?  
Major problems associated with the doctrine of ‘self-execution’ arise from cases 
and scholarly works that promote it. This is the result of the intricate problem of 
the absence of a clear understanding of ‘self-execution’ and that of the absence 
of a coherent method of determining the qualities a treaty should possess or lack 
for it to be declared self-executing or otherwise (assuming municipal law plays 
no part). This is particularly so as judicial and academic opinions from the 
United States (in which the doctrine has had its greatest use) is hardly consistent 
and increasingly gets as confusing as it could get with every treaty that is 
declared non-self-executing in the US courts. The non-self-executing conclusion 
has indeed been one to which so many winding paths lead.  
The question as to when a treaty is ‘self-executing’ therefore receives as 
many answers as the different notions underlying the doctrine so much so that 
one cannot understand what a writer or a judge means by ‘self-executing’ 
without first seeking to know their shared or peculiar perspective to it. As aptly 
captured by Dalton: 
                                           
60 Medellín, supra note 54. There have however been instances where provisions of the UN 
Charter have been declared “self-executing” in the US – Saipan v. United States Dep't of 
Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1974); Namba v. McCourt  case and Sei Fujii v. 
State 217 P.2d 481 (1950) are examples. 
61 Bradley’s statement that “federal courts can no longer apply international law of its own 
force” appears to underlie this understanding. See Curtis A. Bradley, (1997) “The 
Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of 
International Law”, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 523. 
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It is often unclear to an American reader which meaning the user had in 
mind. I am sure many of you have had the experience, as I have, of 
encountering the use of the term ‘self-executing’ by the same writer in similar 
contexts but in different senses, and wondering if the second use was by 
choice or by chance. The risk of confusion for the foreign reader particularly 
one from a dualist legal system who is most likely to understand self-
executing as meaning solely that there is no need for implementing 
legislation-is very high. Such a reader is unlikely to know that there are at 
least three other possible meanings of ‘self-executing’ and is likely to be 
misled if the user had in mind one (or several) of them.62 
Since the concept of ‘self-execution’ relates to the implementation of 
international law in the legal systems of States, it demands, not only an 
understanding of the modes by which States implement international law but 
also the distinction between them, as far as it is possible.  
The question as to when a treaty becomes operative as municipal law 
receives various answers when the disparate modes by which constitutions 
implement treaties are taken into consideration.63 A meticulously derived 
answer would have to accommodate two or probably three variants of monism – 
systems that are monist in effect but distinguished by processes64– as well as 
variants of dualism that are equally distinguished by processes but dualist in 
effect.65 To avoid taking every constitutional peculiarity into consideration, it 
suits our present purpose to adopt the two broad classifications into which 
constitutions are usually grouped. The first relates to legal systems where 
treaties acquire the force of municipal law by the same processes by which they 
are ratified – monism.66 The second covers legal systems where the ratification 
processes are different from the processes by which the treaty acquires domestic 
force – dualism.67  The effect of the former is to make treaties automatically or 
                                           
62 Dalton, supra, note 2, p. 442. 
63 Iwasawa “International Law in the Japanese” supra, note 27 p. 302. 
64 Compare: article VI of the US Constitution; article 55 of the Constitution of France and 
article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde 1992. 
65 For instance, Nigeria and Ghana are dualist States. In Nigeria the legislature gets involved 
in treaty matters only when the treaty is to be domesticated, but in Ghana, the legislature 
is involved in ratification as well as in domestication. It is thus possible to confuse 
legislative involvement in ratification in Ghana for domestication.  
66 A monist constitution generally draws no distinction between international law and 
municipal law. It generally allows international law to operate within the national realm 
without the aid of a specific municipal legislation.  
67 A dualist constitution draws a distinction between national laws and international law and 
requires international law to be transformed into the shape of national legislation before it 
could be enforced nationally. This is the legacy of the English common law. See Lord 
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directly applicable upon fulfilling the ratification processes but under the latter, 
treaties are never directly or automatically applicable, and are not applicable 
without additional legislation.68 The marked distinction between the two 
systems is usually confused in some definitions of the doctrine of ‘self-
execution’.  
Generally, ‘self-execution’ is most commonly understood as a monistic 
doctrine wherein implementing legislations are generally not required for a 
treaty to have the force of municipal law.69 ‘Non-self-execution’,70 on the other 
hand, generally follows the dualist system wherein treaties require implementing 
legislation before municipal courts can apply it. 
The legislative action envisaged here does not necessarily need to come after 
the treaty has become binding on a dualist State internationally; legislative 
action could be taken in advance of ratifying a treaty.  States operating dualism 
understand self-execution to be a feature of another system and regard non-self-
executing as a feature of theirs. And this explains why non-self-execution best 
describes constitutions that are patterned after the dualist approach.  
                                                                                                            
Atkin in Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General forOntario [1937) 1 A.C. 326, 
347. 
68 The South African Constitution appears to combine both methods in practice. See Botha, 
supra, note 29, p. 101. The same can also be said of the US Constitution as already shown 
above.  
69 See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 356(5th Cir. 1981) (defining self-executing 
treaties as those that "are binding domestic law of their own accord, without the need for 
implementing legislation"); Swaine, supra, note 2, p. 353 (stating that “[i]f a treaty 
provision is self-executing, no legislation is necessary before it acquires domestic force of 
law); Solomon, supra note 43, 464 (agreeing that self-executing treaties “require no 
implementation in order to be given judicial effect”); Hans Kelsen, (2003)Principles of 
International Law, 401-447 (stating that a norm of international law which is applicable 
by the organs of the States without further implementation by national law may be called 
a self-executing norm). 
70 Sloss, “Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 146, (noting that a treaty provision is “not self-
executing” if it has no status as domestic law in the absence of implementing legislation); 
Swaine, supra, note 2, p. 353  (arguing that “labelling a provision as non-self-executing is 
usually (though not always) intended to suggest that legislation is necessary for domestic 
enforcement”); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 
1985) (stating that international agreements that are not self-executing "are merely 
executory agreements between the contracting nations and have no effect on domestic law 
absent additional governmental action"); Vázquez, “Laughing at Treaties”, supra, note 
20, p. 2173-2174 (noting “[t]he often expressed sense that non-self-executing treaties lack 
the force of domestic law appears to be based on the fact that such treaties, unlike most 
law,  cannot be enforced in court against those on whom the treaty purports to impose a 
duty, by those for whose benefit the treaty imposes the duty”). 
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Intriguingly, some writers have been keen to also apply the doctrine to 
dualist constitutions to distinguish between provisions in implemented treaties 
that require further legislative action from those that do not require further 
legislative action. In this regard, Preuss has argued that a “cursory examination 
of constitutional texts” does not answer the question of when treaties are self-
executing or require incorporation. He suggested that certain treaties could be 
directly applicable in dualist States through “judicial or administrative practice 
… notwithstanding the lack of any formal constitutional text which expressly 
accords to them this effect”.71 Projecting the idea of the application of “self-
executing treaties” to dualist constitutions, Preuss used the UK practice of 
sometimes securing enabling legislation in advance of ratification to argue that 
“treaties in the United Kingdom are self-executing even in circumstances in 
which like treaties in the United States might not be”.72 He argued that since 
anticipatory legislation puts the British Government in a position to give effect 
to treaties internally from the moment the treaty becomes binding internationally 
(without further legislative action), the treaty is, in effect, self-executing by 
virtue of prior legislative action, or by reason of the fact that legislation 
adequate for its internal enforcement was already in existence at the time of the 
ratification of the treaty.73 
Following the same line of reasoning, Agusman argued that the legal nature 
of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties relates to questions of direct 
enforceability and municipal validity; and further argued that self-execution 
concerns the domestic judicial enforcement of treaties while non-self-execution 
is about municipal validity.74 Furthermore:  
The direct enforceable and non-self-executing rules are common in every 
case of law application and may occur in municipal rules of dualist and 
monist States. Most scholars submit that if the term 'non-self-executing 
treaties' is meant to be not capable of being executed in the absence of 
additional implementing measures, it may also be equally applicable to other 
legislations or constitutions. Many provisions of national legal orders are not 
capable by themselves to be executed without some additional legislation. A 
non-self-executing provision is not a question that exclusively relates to 
treaties but a common problem associated with the norms. Likewise, treaties 
might presumably be self-executing in dualist States if an implementing 
legislation has been provided or adequate before ratification.75 
                                           
71 Preuss, supra, note 38, p. 1126. 
72 Id., p. 1124. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Agusman, supra, note 18, p. 331. 
75 Id., p. 328. 
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Agusman’s distinction between ‘validity’ and ‘implementation’ is difficult to 
comprehend. ‘Self-execution’, in whatever sense it could be understood, cannot 
rightly relate to validity. The validity of a norm of the international order is, 
unlike municipal implementation and enforcement, not judged by the internal 
processes of any State. Otherwise, on what basis would a dualist judge rely on 
an unincorporated treaty or even a treaty to which the forum State is not a party 
as interpretative aid?76 By so doing, the judge, though cannot apply the treaty as 
a municipal law, recognises that it is a valid legal norm of another order – 
international law.   
Besides, the view that certain treaties could be directly applicable in dualist 
States by judicial fiat is hardly tenable in that judges in dualistic systems lack 
flexibility or discretion in the application of international law. The 
determination of applicable international law is properly the well-guarded 
province of the legislature. For monistic systems, the situation is different; 
judges may exercise some level of flexibility and discretion over treaties that 
could constitutionally be directly applied.77 This explains the origin of the ‘self-
executing’ doctrine in the first place and why courts in the US often treat direct 
application of international law as a question of treaty interpretation.  
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,78 for example, while agreeing that the 
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico has the force of law, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “if … it is self-executing, it would appear 
that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual ....”. The reasoning of the 
learned Chief Justice appears to contain a subtle distinction between a decision 
that a particular treaty is self-executing for the purpose of declaring it the law of 
                                           
76 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (using the ICCPR and other 
human rights treaties to which the United States was not then a party to support the 
conclusion that torture is a "violation of the law of nations"); Ahmadv. ILEA, [1978] 1 
Q.B.36 (holding that United Kingdom courts pay very serious regard to unimplemented 
treaties and will interpret statutory language and apply common law principles, wherever 
possible, so as to reach a conclusion consistent with the  international obligations of the 
United Kingdom); H. Raynerv. Department of Trade, [1989], Ch. 72, 163-4 (holding, per 
Kerr LJ, that the doctrine precluding the enforcement of unincorporated treaties in 
England does not preclude the decision of justiciable issues which arise against the 
background of an unincorporated treaty in a way which renders it necessary or convenient 
to refer to, and consider, the contents of the treaty). 
77 David R. Deener (1964) “Treaties, Constitutions and Judicial Review” 4 Va. J. Int'l L. 7, 
29  (arguing that regardless of the judicial review powers of the court in a dualist system, 
it can only apply domestic law, and if domestic rules are not sufficient to implement a 
treaty or are in conflict with treaty obligations, that is not a matter for the courts to 
resolve; whereas a judge within a monistic system, in which treaties are part of the law of 
the land, comes face to face with treaties and it may prove necessary for a court to resolve 
a conflict with the constitution). 
78 106. 504 U.S. 655, 667(1992). 
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the land but not self-executing for the purpose of creating rights and obligations 
for individuals. It is a typical signalling of the distinction in the US between 
treaties as the law of the land and judicial applicability. More explicitly: “under 
the Foster concept of self-execution, a non-self-executing treaty has domestic 
legal force, but it cannot be applied directly by the judiciary”.79 Putting it 
differently, Andrea Bianchi argued that: 
… the basic understanding of self-execution of international norms is that 
once the rule has been incorporated into the municipal legal order, its direct 
applicability is a matter of whether or not the rule, by its content lends itself 
to be applied directly by the judge.80 
This distinction, bordering on discretion, between domestic force and self-
executing is not for a dualistic judge; except a treaty is implemented, it is not 
applicable and once a treaty is implemented and accords with the constitution, 
the judge has no discretion but to apply it as municipal law upon the terms 
specified by the legislature. Accordingly, some of the views expressed above, 
hardly fit into the general understanding of ‘self-execution’, as a means of 
differentiating treaties that do not require an enabling municipal legislation from 
those that require such legislation. It is the view of the present writers, self-
execution (rather than ‘judicial application’) actually concerns the application of 
treaties that have not been incorporated into the municipal legal order. Once 
incorporated the question of self-execution or otherwise no longer arises as 
incorporation sufficiently enables judicial application.  This increasing tendency 
to stretch the doctrine of ‘self-execution’ beyond a realistic monistic application 
to an unsupportable dualist application has greatly contributed to the increasing 
confusion shrouding the doctrine.   
As for the method of identifying self-executing treaties, there are views in the 
literature that a treaty is self-executing if it: (a) involves the rights and duties of 
individuals;81 (b) does not cover a subject for which legislative action is 
required; 82 (c) does not leave discretion to the parties in the application of the 
particular provisions;83(d) is addressed to the courts,84 and (e) if self-execution 
can be collected from the language used.85  
                                           
79 Sloss, “The Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 149; Huang, supra, note 13, p. 2215, 
(referring to “implemented non-self-executing”). 
80 Bianchi, supra, note 2, pp. 758-9. 
81 Agusman supra, note 18, p. 325 (arguing that a treaty is directly applicable if it 
establishes subjective rights and duties for the individual; and if the individual can rely on 
it before national courts and national authorities). 
82 Oscar Schachter, (1950-1951) “The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights 
Provisions in American Law”, 4Vand. L. Rev., 645-646. 
83 Riesenfeld, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and Gatt”, supra, note 27, p. 550. 
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In our view, the term ‘self-executing’, insofar as it seeks to suggest that 
treaties could apply by their own force without the aid of municipal law in one 
form or the other, clearly has no practical tenability. Furthermore, though yet 
confusing, we are of the view that it would lose some of its complexities if it is 
properly confined to monist constitutions as the effect of a constitutional norm 
permitting the automatic application of treaties.  
Though a finding that a treaty is self-executing, basically has the same effect 
as a finding that it is directly applicable and generally understood as such, direct 
applicability does not lend itself to the sort of malleability to which ‘self-
execution’ lends itself. It is thus essential to understand that the two terms could 
mean the same thing only when ‘self-execution’ is used in the sense of the 
application of international law in the municipal realm without the need for 
specific legislation. If direct applicability cannot be understood to mean the 
application of international law by its own force, self-execution should not be 
read into monist constitutions simply because they permit the application of 
international law as seemingly stand-alone sources. In actual fact, the so-called 
directly applicable treaties stand on the constitutional provisions by which the 
ability of treaties to directly apply is prescribed. The pivotal role municipal law 
plays in this regard explains why “same rule can be directly applicable in one 
state but not in another”86 and why the “determination with respect to the 
precision of an international rule may vary from one state to another”.87 
What we can see today, is the direct applicability of European Union (EU) 
laws within member States in a manner that falls in line with what the 
proponents of self-executing treaties would pass for treaties that execute in 
municipal realm on their own force. However, drawing from the European 
Union example, direct applicability –a much more practical term– is sometimes 
confused with the so-called authority of international law to ‘self-execute’ within 
the municipal system by its own authority. The obvious foundation for that 
argument are the various cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and by which it engineered the supremacy and direct effect of 
                                                                                                            
84 Alona E. Evans, (1951) “Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties”, 45 
Proceedings of Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 66, 74. 
85 Virginia A. Leary, “International Labour Conventions and National Law: The 
Effectiveness of The Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National Legal Systems”, 57-
63 (1982) (identifying the intention of the parties, the language of the treaty and its 
subject matter as the decisive criteria); George N Barrie, (1995) “Self-Executing v Non-
Self-Executing Treaties: The Confusion Continues” Journal of South Afr. L. 368 (arguing, 
rather peculiarly, that treaties entered into by the US President without senate approval 
are “self-executing” while those entered with senate approval are “non-self-executing”) 
How more confusing can a concept be? 
86 Iwasawa, “International Law in the Japanese”, supra, note 27, p. 304. 
87Ibid. 
Myths and Realities in ‘Self Executing Treaties’                                                                       25 
 
 
EU laws within member States. In Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratieder Belastingen88 and the subsequent Costav. ENEL,89 the court 
held that the European Economic Community (now EU) Treaty differed from 
ordinary treaties and that the Community law creates rights directly enforceable 
by individuals in the national courts of the member States. 
The language of the CJEU in the cases, strong though, could not have had 
any real impact in the municipal realm except such impact be granted it. 
Irrespective of this language, a non-EU State is in no less in violation of 
international law for failing to implement an international obligation than an EU 
State that fails to give direct effect to EU treaty.90 The standard of violation and 
the principle prescribing that standard are the same: a State cannot rely on 
deficiencies in its municipal law to excuse its international obligation”,91and this 
makes it incumbent upon every State that has entered into an international 
agreement to adjust its municipal law accordingly.92 The significant difference is 
that EU operates as a peculiar international sovereign entity; a “peculiar 
phenomenon … which does not fit into any regular pattern of international 
law”93 in matters of its competence.94 As in fact noted by the CtJEU, the EU is 
                                           
88 [1963] ECR 1. 
89 [1964] ECR 585, 593-594. 
90 Stotter,  supra, note 12, p. 773 (noting that “the question of self-execution is relevant 
solely to the effect of a treaty as domestic law, since a properly signed and ratified treaty 
is a binding international obligation whether or not it is self-executing”). 
91 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969; Alabama 
Claims Arbitration, (1872) 1 Int. Arb, 495; J.B. Moore, History and Digest of 
International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, Vol. 1,chapter 
XIV 653 (Washington 1898). For a detailed discussion of this case see Tom Bingham, 
‘The Alabama Claims Arbitration’, 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2005); Treatment of Polish 
Nationals or other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in Danziq (1931), PCIJ, Ser. A/B 
No.44, p. 24; Greco-Bulgarian Communities (1930), PCIJ, Ser. B No. 17, p. 32; Free 
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, (1932) PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 46, p. 167. 
92 See Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Series B, No. 
10, p. 20, (recalling “the ‘self-evident’ principle, ‘according to which a State which has 
contracted valid international  obligations is bound  to make in its legislation such  
modifications  as may  be  necessary to ensure the fulfillment  of  the obligations 
undertaken”); Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite,(Belgium v. 
Senegal), Judgment of July 20, 2012, para 113 (holding that article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties reflects customary international law and that it is 
incumbent on a State that has entered into an international obligation to adopt necessary 
legislation in its internal law to fulfill the obligation, otherwise, the State cannot invoke 
its internal law to defeat it).See article 46 VCLT for what may be an exception to some 
aspects of the application of the rule); Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite, (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Rep. 2012, 422. 
93 K. Lipstein, (1974)The Law of the European Economic Community, 45 (London: 
Butterworths); Gerhard Bebr, (1970) “Directly Applicable Provisions of Community 
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more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting States; it constitutes a new legal order capable of conferring rights 
and imposing obligations directly upon individuals”.95 In consequence, EU 
treaties, unlike general treaties, are invested with borderless application across 
EU States, largely free of the limitations of territorial jurisdictions of member 
States. When and how this complete synergy of EU laws with the municipal law 
of each member State was achieved, is a question to be answered in close 
observation of the legislative actions that each of the member States had to 
undertake.96 
4. Self-Execution: The Treaty Intent 
Every treaty is aimed at achieving a purpose, which may be fully satisfied as 
between the treaty parties internationally or by each treaty party satisfying the 
obligation to the other treaty parties by fulfilling the terms of the treaty towards 
its nationals. To recall the PCIJ in the Danzig opinion, “the very object of an 
international agreement according to the intention of the contracting parties, 
may be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules creating individual 
rights and obligations and enforceable by national courts”.97 
It is instructive to reiterate that “[n]o treaty provision can be directly 
applicable [municipally] unless it is also automatically incorporated”98 because 
“judges cannot rely on a provision as a rule of decision if it has no status as 
domestic law”.99 The principal factor and indeed the melting point in the 
determination of the true authority for the application of international law in 
                                                                                                            
Law: Development of Community Concept”, 19 Int'l & Com. L.Q.257, 261 (arguing that 
“[b]y its content and objectives, however, it is a constitution of an emerging Community 
which goes far beyond a mere traditional international treaty”). 
94 See Curtis A. Bradley “Self‐Execution and Treaty Duality”, (2008) 1The Supreme Court 
Review, 131; Juliane Kokott and Thomas Diehn, (2002) “Kingdom of the Netherlands v. 
European Parliament & Council of the European Union. Case C- 377/98. 2001 ECR I-
7079”, 96(4) Am J Int’l L, 950, 954. 
95 Van Gend en Loos, supra, note 88, 12. 
96 Friedl Weiss (1979) “Self Executing Treaties and Directly Applicable EEC Law in 
French Courts” 6 Legal Issues of Eur. Integration 51, 76 (noting that member States are 
to secure the application and supremacy of EU Law in conformity with the methods and 
procedures permitted by their constitutional law and other provisions of the domestic 
legal system). 
97 Danzig, supra note 43, pp. 17-18.  
98 Sloss, “The Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 148. 
99 Ibid, p. 148. 
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national spheres is that the internal applicability of a treaty is absolutely within 
the domestic jurisdiction of States.100 
Since, in every municipal system of law, international law operates on the 
basis of a national law, the application of international law in the national sphere 
is an area that is not admissive of assumptions; the starting point of any inquiry 
must be from the standpoint of the prevailing legal order itself. And the 
principal question is whether municipal laws “recognize the operation per se of 
international law within the State without a special transforming act of 
municipal legislation”.101 This observation is not altered by merely stating that a 
particular country is monist in nature. In any case, it must first be understood 
that monism is a product of municipal law; a country is monist because it has 
adopted a system of law that permits international law to directly operate as part 
of municipal law.102 In fact, every treaty is executed municipally by the force of 
an instrument and that instrument is the constitution in monist systems and an 
implementing legislation in dualist systems. ‘Self-execution’ and ‘direct effect’ 
are each “a domestic law problem which cannot be resolved on an international 
law basis”.103 
It remains to be said, however, that the primus authority accorded to 
municipal law in this respect is overshadowed (from the viewpoint of 
international law) by the rule that a State is not permitted to defeat its 
international obligation by reason of its domestic law.104 Accordingly, the rule 
that the determinant of when a treaty is effective within municipal legal system 
is municipal law; though this justifies the refusal of municipal institutions to 
apply a treaty, it does not absolve a State of its international law liability arising 
from its failure to implement a treaty that it has undertaken to execute in good 
faith.105 
                                           
100Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama v. Board of County Commr’s 197 F. Supp. 230 245 
(holding that whether a treaty is self-executing or not presents primarily a domestic 
question of construction for the courts); Iwasawa, “The Doctrine”,  supra, note 1, p. 651 
(noting, and rightly too, that despite the confusing signals from scholars that “[s]tates 
determine how to implement their international obligations on the municipal level [and 
that] [i]t is well recognised that municipal law determines the ‘validity’ and ‘rank’ of 
treaties in domestic law” id. p. 651). 
101 H. Lauterpacht, (1975) “International Law and Municipal Law’ in Collected Papers” 218 
(Vol 2: The Law of Peace (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
102 Alona E. Evans, (1953) “Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America”, 30 
Brit Y.B Int’l L 178, 178 (arguing that “the process of [municipal] enforcement [of 
treaties is] essentially a municipal law matter”.) 
103 Stotter, supra, note 12, p. 785. 
104 Generally see, supra, note 92 above. 
105 Ibid. 
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The need for incorporation arises when the treaty cannot achieve its aim 
except under the municipal law of the parties. The domestic application of 
treaties crafted to have effect as municipal law has an international aspect and a 
domestic aspect which go paripassu.106 The process of fulfilling each aspect is 
the same both in monist and dualist constitutions, though approached 
differently. By consenting to the treaty, a State fulfils the international aspect 
and this is only possible by following the mode set out in the treaty. The fact of 
consent alone does not fulfil the municipal aspect; this has to be fulfilled by the 
mode set out by municipal law.  
The intended realm of performance may be a determining factor in 
ascertaining the domestic suitability of a treaty.  For instance, insofar as treaties 
such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Charter of the United 
Nations can wholly be performed on the international realm, they cannot be said 
to be domestically suitable as their remedies do not lie in domestic enforcement. 
The same is however not true of human rights treaties, such as the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.107 Human rights treaties are usually 
crafted to take effect as domestic law and usually locate their remedies in 
domestic enforcement. The intention of the parties to make such treaties 
effective municipally, notwithstanding, the question of how and when they 
become domestically effective is a question for the domestic laws of State 
parties.  
                                           
106 Stefan A. Riesenfeld, (1980) (Comment) “The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and 
U.S. V. Postal: Win at Any Price?” 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 892, 900 (arguing that “[t]he self-
executing nature of a treaty provisions is a product of international and domestic 
constitutional rules”); David Sloss, (2002) “Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a 
Constitutional Fallacy” 36(1) U.C. Davis Law Review, 1, 81  (advocating a four –step 
approach for US courts: (a) a determination of whether a treaty creates a primary 
international duty; (b) whether the primary duty is executed or executory; (c) whether the 
treaty creates a primary domestic duty; and (d) whether the treaty is domestically 
enfoceable.  He argued that the treaty makers' intentions are irrelevant at this stage); and 
(d) if the treaty creates a primary domestic duty, the court will now have to consider 
whether the duty is such that is enforceable by a domestic court). 
107 In Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & Interights v. Cameroon, 
Communication 272/03, para 115, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights declared, in effect, that article 1 of the African Charter imposes on State parties, 
the obligations to implement all the measures required to produce the result of protecting 
the individuals living in their territory; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
328, 397 (1986), the European Court of Human Rights held that, although there is no 
obligation to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms into domestic law, “by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the substance of 
the rights and freedoms set forth must be secured under the domestic legal order, in some 
form or another, to everyone within the jurisdiction of the Contracting States”). 
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We may thus classify two categories of treaties. The first covers those which 
are fully fulfilled as between the parties on the international realm by 
performing or refraining to perform acts that are purely international. The 
second set do not confer reciprocal benefits and obligations on the parties, but 
the obligations and benefits arising from the treaty are fulfilled towards the other 
parties by guaranteeing the benefits and obligations of the treaty to nationals and 
aliens within the territories of the parties. Thus, while the first class of treaties 
does not need to engage with municipal law to fulfil its object, the latter must 
engage with municipal law.  
The intention of the contracting parties to apply municipal law is thus 
collectable from the object and purpose of the treaty. Whether expressly stated 
or not, where the object of a treaty cannot be achieved without engagement with 
municipal law, it would be presumed that the parties intended the treaty to take 
effect as municipal law. It is important to state that the language of the treaty 
and its intent to have effect as municipal law assume little or no significance 
before judges in dualistic States; that is a matter for the legislature, which has to 
define whether the treaty belongs to the category of treaties that requires 
municipal performance. The decision of the legislature, however unlawful, from 
the standpoint of international law, is what dualist judges are bound to 
enforce.108 
The same is not true of monist States where judges, as of necessity, examine 
the terms of a treaty when determining their municipal applicability. This is 
especially true of the US and potentially true of South Africa.109 There is 
therefore room for a monist judge determining the domestic application of a 
treaty to examine whether the treaty contains “express stipulations that it should 
or should not be self-executing”.110 As Riesenfeld rightly argued: 
the intent of the parties to an international treaty is relevant only to the 
question of whether private individuals shall have the right of protection in 
domestic courts against violations of a treaty provision. Whether this result is 
to be achieved by legislation of by the treaty itself is a question of 
                                           
108 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI), (United States of Americav. Italy), ICJ Rep 1989, 15, 51, 
para 73 (holding that compliance with municipal law and compliance with the provisions 
of a treaty are different questions and that what is a breach of treaty may be lawful in the 
municipal law and what is unlawful in the municipal law may be wholly innocent of 
violation of a treaty provision);  Roodt, supra, note 34, p. 72  (noting that National courts 
tend to operate within specific limits when giving effect to international law in their 
municipal sphere of jurisdiction). 
109 See Part 1 above. 
110 Stotter, supra, note 12, p. 777. 
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constitutional law and not within the purview of the intent either of the 
parties or of a particular ratifying power.111 
Insofar as it is the municipal law of each State that determines the application of 
international law municipally, “the intent of the other State parties is irrelevant, 
and even the treaty-making authorities of that state party whose domestic law is 
involved may have little or no choice according to the governing constitutional 
provisions”.112 
Consequently, while the intention of the treaty determines whether the treaty 
is suitable for domestic enforcement, when the question is how domestic 
enforcement is achieved, treaty intent makes a shift to constitutional intent, thus 
placing municipal enforcement of the treaty at the mercy of the constitution. 
This argument, though popular,113 is not a candidate for general acceptance; 
there is yet the treaty intent approach which proceeds on the basis that the 
question of direct enforceability of treaty provisions is primarily, if not 
exclusively, a problem of international law.114  
                                           
111 Riesenfeld, “Win at Any Price?” supra, note 106, p. 895. 
112 Riesenfeld, id., p.  898   
113 Thomas Buergenthal, (1992-IV) “Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in 
National and International Law”, RdC, 303, 317, (arguing that it is domestic law that 
determines whether a treaty creates rights which domestic courts are empowered to 
enforce in a state); R. Higgins, (1987) “United Kingdom, in the Effect of Treaties in 
Domestic Law, 123, 125 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds.,) (stating that “[a] 
treaty has no effect in English law unless it is made part of domestic law”). 
114 See J. A. Winter, (1972) “Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and 
Different Concepts in Community Law”, 9 Common Market Law Rev., 428; Leslie 
Henry, (1929) “When Is a Treaty Self-Executing”, Michigan Law Review, 776, 785 
(arguing that whether a treaty is self-executing depends on the intent of the treaty makers 
as expressed in the treaty, discoverable from the language of the treaty by words that are 
legislative in form and meaning); Lorne Oral Liechty,(1979-1980) “Treaties – Article 6 
of the Convention on them High Seas Is Not Self-Executing”, 55 Notre Dame Law, 293, 
297 (ascribing the primary criterion to be considered by a court in resolving the issue of 
domestic application to the intent of the parties that the treaty would become binding 
without any implementing legislation); Riesenfeld, “The Doctrine of Self-Executing 
Treaties and Gatt” supra, note 27, p. 548, (noting the reasoning of a German court that 
the self-executing character of a treaty could be determined on the basis of the intent of 
the contracting parties, as deduced from the language and the character of the treaty as 
well as from other relevant materials); Mary D. Hallerman (Casenote) “Medellin v. 
Texas: The Treaties that Bind”, (2008-2009)43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 797 (noting the view of 
the US Supreme Court in Medellin that a treaty could convey an intention that it be 
“self-executing”); Schachter, supra, note 82, p. 645-646 (arguing that a treaty is self-
executing except it explicitly states that it requires legislative action); United Shoe Mach. 
Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co, 155 f. 842, 845 (1ST Cir. 1907) (holding that the 
language in which a treaty is framed determines its municipal effectiveness). 
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The logical consequence of the treaty-intent approach is a creation of a 
fantasy in which municipal law plays a secondary role to international law in 
both the international sphere and in the national sphere. The corollary of this 
may be the creation of a situation of inequality between a State that accepts the 
treaty-intent approach and other State parties that do not accept that approach.115 
This is because while the treaty immediately becomes a law within the 
municipality of States that flow with the treaty intent, its applicability is 
rebuffed by the municipal law of States that do not. This problem was identified 
by the US Supreme Court in Postal v. United States: 
The convention on the high seas is a multilateral treaty which has been 
ratified by over fifty nations, some of which do not recognize self-executing. 
It is difficult therefore to ascribe to the language of the treaty any common 
intent that the treaty should of its own force operate as the domestic law of 
the ratifying nations. ... The lack of mutuality between the United States and 
countries that do not recognize treaties as self-executing would seem to call 
for as much.116 
The treaty-intent approach compels the examination of the basis of the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. The origin of 
the distinction in the US has already been discussed as the most imitated basis of 
the distinction. The point earlier made about the context of the US Constitution 
within which Marshall C.J., acted, would, perhaps, illuminate this view. If we 
keep our reasoning within the context of the US Constitution, it would be 
obvious that Marshall C.J., did not query the applicability of treaties in the 
United States; what he was concerned with was whether the language of the 
treaty conveyed the intention that a further legislative action was required to 
give proper effect to the treaty. Hence Marshall made a general reference to 
countries in which a treaty is “not a legislative act” and “does not generally 
effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished ... but is carried into execution by 
legislation or other exercises of sovereign power”.117 Marshal also compared 
such countries with the United States, where the “constitution declares a treaty 
to be the supreme law of the land” and thus “equivalent to an act of the 
legislature, whenever it operates of itself ...”.118 
                                           
115 Buergenthal, supra, note 113, p. 320 (stating that “courts may and often do answer this 
question whether a treaty is self-executing differently in different countries, depending 
upon their national constitutions, legal traditions, historical precedents and political 
institutions”). 
116 Supra, note 25, p. 878. 
117 Foster, supra, note 1, p. 314. 
118 Ibid. 
32                               MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No.1                              September 2016  
 
 
Furthermore, he had queried: if the “language is, that those grants shall be 
ratified and confirmed ... by whom shall they be ratified and confirmed?”119 
Thus, while failing to find that the authority to “ratify and confirm” was intrinsic 
to the treaty in Foster, he came to the opposite conclusion in Percheman, where 
he construed the instrument to mean that the grants shall be ratified and 
confirmed might import that they “shall be ratified and confirmed by the force 
of the instrument itself”.120 
This should not be understood as saying that the object to the served by a 
treaty and the mode by which the parties intended that object to be served as 
collectable from the treaty language are not important. They are relevant to the 
question of whether a treaty is such that could be applied municipally in the first 
place. It is thus questionable to assume that “treaties can be classified into those 
that are directly applicable and those that are not on the international plane”.121 
Accordingly, three classes of treaties may be roughly envisaged – (i) those 
that need not be enforceable domestically, such as the UN Charter; (ii) those that 
are required to be enforced domestically by express language, such as the 
African Charter; and (iii) those which, though do not expressly require domestic 
application, their object and purpose cannot be truly fulfilled without domestic 
application.  
In the first categories are treaties that do not require domestic application for 
the fulfilment of their objects. These are usually treaties which are made to be 
enforced only by States; they do not create private rights and States do not need 
to domesticate them to benefit therefrom. The United Nations Charter is in this 
class. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS), 1982, 
also falls within this category. Nevertheless, nothing stops States, both monist 
and dualist, from adopting legislative measures respecting part or all of a treaty 
of this class, especially for the aim of enforcing the rights granted to States by 
the treaty. For example, articles 3, 33, 56-57 and 76 of the UNCLOS define 
different maritime zones to which coaster States are entitled. States usually 
appropriate these zones by adopting legislations; these legislations define the 
laws made regarding the zones as well as serve as notice to all other States.    
In the second category are those treaties, which the obligation to make them 
municipally applicable is part of the obligations imposed on the parties by the 
treaty. These treaties usually create private rights. The fact, however, that a 
treaty creates private rights that could be –and was indeed intended to be– 
enforced within the municipal realm of State parties is only one of the two 
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121 Id., p. 651. 
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factors that are to be taken into account in determining the municipal 
applicability of the treaty. The second is the constitutional approach to treaties.  
In the third category are such treaties as the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, 1961, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
1963. Notwithstanding that these treaties do not contain any express stipulation 
for municipal application, States usually implement them by legislation122 in 
realisation of the fact that their objects cannot be fulfilled without municipal 
application. 
It is not uncommon to encounter the argument that a treaty provision, such as 
article 1 of the African Charter; article 2(2) ICCPR and article 2 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, 1984 (that provide for the adoption of further 
legislative measures to give effect to the rights recognized therein), require 
incorporation in both monistic and dualistic States.123 The bottom line is that a 
treaty cannot, by its terms, convert a monist State into a dualist one by 
mandating the monistic State to adopt further legislative measures for the 
purpose of implementing the treaty in spite of the fact that the constitution 
makes the treaty domestically applicable upon being ratified;124 nor can a treaty 
convert a dualist state into a monist state. 
The reliance on such treaty stipulations to argue that a treaty is not directly 
applicable in a monist State strays too far away from what could be regarded as 
the correct position. Such a language can neither explain the direct applicability 
of a treaty in a monist State nor confer the direct applicability on a dualist State. 
For example, article 1 of the African Charter contains the undertaking that State 
parties to the Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined 
in the Charter and undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give them 
effect. The fulfilment of that undertaking is usually assessed on the basis of the 
constitutional posture of State parties. It is generally taken for granted that State 
                                           
122 Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act (Nigeria); Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act (South Africa); Diplomatic Privileges Act (UK). 
123 Sloss, “The Domestication” note 2 p. 156 (suggesting that article 2(2) renders the ICCPR 
non-self-executing, or that comparable language in any other human rights treaty makes 
it non-self-executing). 
124 Halberstam, supra, note 7, p. 97 (asserting that “[i]t is only where the treaty by its terms 
requires legislative action that it cannot be applied by the courts directly”; Chafee, supra, 
note 13, p. 357, (arguing that “express language in the treaty may require … 
implementation”); Danilenko, Supra, note 35, p. 299 (arguing that “[a]ny treaty 
provision that expressly requires states to adopt legislative measures cannot be 
considered directly applicable or self-executing”); William C. Gordon, (1950) 
“International Law: Self-Executing Treaties: The Genocide Convention” 48 Michigan 
Law Review, 852, 854  (stating that intent is “beyond dispute when a treaty expressly 
stipulates for legislative implementation”). 
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parties operating constitutional provisions allowing for the direct application of 
international law do not require additional legislation to give effect to the 
Charter. That this is the view maintained by monist State parties is confirmed in 
their periodic reports to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.125 
It is instructive to note that the word “undertakes” in article 94 of the UN 
Charter, by reason of which the US Supreme Court classified the UN Charter as 
a non-self-executing in Medellin,126 is the same word used in the African 
Charter that the monist State parties did not regard as meaning that the Charter 
cannot be directly applicable. None of the State parties to the African Charter 
has taken the view of the US Supreme Court that the word ‘undertakes’ 
connotes anticipated future action by the parties.127 Article 94 may have been 
non-self-executing for all other reasons but certainly not for reason of its 
language. The focus of the Supreme Court on language was thus in keeping with 
constricting article VI of the US Constitution.  
Commenting on article 2(2) of the ICCPR which bears substantial similarities 
with article 1 of the African Charter, Sloss remarked that “far from reflecting a 
mutual intent to require implementing legislation”,128 the language of article 
2(2) “reflects a mutual intent to permit each party to decide for itself whether 
implementing legislation is necessary”.129 
                                           
125 In Senegal, the African Charter is “a component part of the national legal system which 
judicial institutions are duty-bound to enforce when its provisions are invoked before 
them” – Report on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights Presented by the Republic of Senegal, April 2013, Para 102; in Algeria, the 
African Charter is “part and parcel of the national legislation and may be invoked by 
citizens in a court of law” – Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Algeria African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights Third and Fourth Periodic reports August 2006, p. 11; 
Rwanda – 9th - 10th Periodic Report of Rwanda to the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights, 2005 – July 2010, para 18-22; Cote d’Ivoire – Initial and Combined 
Report of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire to the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; etc. 
126 Medellín, supra, note 54, p. 1356. 
127 Ibid, pp. 1358-59. What may in fact be regarded as the treaty intent is a product of the 
interpretation any municipal court decides to adopt. How could it be explained that a 
treaty that is held not to be applicable under one monist constitution is held to be 
applicable in another. Compare the approaches of the US and German Courts: Carsten 
Hoppe, (2007) “Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United 
States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of 
Consular Rights”, 18 EJIL 2; Jana Gogolin, (2007) “Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come 
to Germany - The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations”, 8 GLJ 3. 
128 Sloss, “Domestication”, supra, note 2, p. 156. 
129 Ibid 
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In all events, implementation would be unnecessary where there already exist 
a national law by which a given State can fulfil its obligation under a 
Convention, the express provisions for the adoption of legislation, 
notwithstanding. That national law may well be the constitutional provision by 
which treaties are directly applicable, as seen in the examples of the 
implementation of the African Charter by the monist State parties above.  Preuss 
came close to making a similar point in his remark that the British practice of 
incorporating treaties by anterior legislation puts the British Government in a 
position to give effect to a treaty internally, dispensing with posterior legislative 
action, as anterior legislation provides adequate legal authority for the automatic 
application of the treaty upon ratification.130 
If the language of a treaty expressing the need for legislation does not make 
it mandatory for all the States to adopt legislation for the fulfilment of its 
obligations, what purpose does such language as contained in article 1 of the 
African Charter serve? The emphasis of such a language for both monist and 
dualist States is that they do not maintain laws that are inconsistent with their 
obligations, so that the legislative measure envisaged for the States may entail 
(for some States) the repelling of laws and the prohibition of subsequent 
inconsistent legislation that may hinder the performance of their obligation.131  
In Amnesty International & others v Sudan,132 the African Commission 
stated that, having by article 1 of the Charter, confirmed that it has bound itself 
to legally respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and to adopt 
legislation to give effect to them,133 “ratification obliges a State to diligently 
undertake the harmonization of its legislation to the provisions of the ratified 
instrument.”134 Affirming the reasoning in Noah Kazingachire & Ors 
(represented by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe,135 the 
Commission held that the existing legislation in Zimbabwe was contrary to the 
spirit of article 1. This, in the view of the Commission, was because it did not 
ensure that there existed in Zimbabwe compensatory damages to give just 
satisfaction to victims in fulfilment of its Charter obligations.136 To remedy this 
                                           
130 Preuss, supra, note 38, p. 1123;(observing the Crown will not exercise its prerogative of 
ratifying treaties to bind the United Kingdom internationally until enabling legislation 
has been passed or parliament has given the necessary assurance that it will be passed). 
131 Iwasawa “International Law in the Japanese Legal Order” supra, note 27, p. 305, 
(arguing that “Such a clause [as article 2(2) of the ICCPR] only reinforces the customary 
international-law rule that a party is bound to take every measure necessary to give full 
effect to the treaty, and thus does not prevent the treaty from being directly applicable). 
132 Communication 48/90, 50/91, 89/93. 
133 Id., para 42. 
134 Id., para 40. 
135 Communication 295/04. 
136 Id., paras 143-144. 
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situation, the Commission recommended that Zimbabwe should undertake law 
reform to bring the domestic laws into conformity with the African Charter.137 
It thus follows that an inquiry into the domestic application of treaties may 
follow a double-decker line of inquiry but only one line of inquiry is mandatory. 
The first is whether a given treaty addressed itself to States for implementation 
within their municipality;138 and the second, and indeed the mandatory one, is 
whether national law permits direct application or incorporation.139 
In order not to lose track of our line of thought, it is essential to reiterate the 
point earlier made that there are common grounds between constitutions that 
permit direct applicability (monism) and those that do not (dualism). One of the 
commonalities of the systems is that both systems proceed from the standpoint 
that domestic law regulates the domestic application of international law. The 
difference is that monism guarantees direct applicability by way of a 
constitutional authorisation given once and for all as a commitment to the direct 
application of certain future ratified treaties while dualism delays authorisation 
for the municipal application of all treaties and delegates the power to the 
legislature to be exercised in each case either prior to, or subsequent to the 
ratification of a treaty. Indeed, “…while the grounds for finding a treaty self-
executing might vary, the effect of a finding that a treaty is self-executing is 
clear”;140 that effect is to make the treaty enforceable in the courts of justice in 
the same circumstances as a statute having the same content.  
Another common feature is that they both have inbuilt mechanisms for 
surprising unwarranted interference of international law in the domestic law 
making process.  The major attraction to non-direct application is that it allows 
the legislature to maintain its role as the law-making organ of the realm as well 
as to maintain control over the influx of externally generated laws.141 The 
essential nature of this legislative power becomes obvious when the 
international application of the treaty requires the adjustment of municipal laws 
and or budgetary allocations. On the other hand, the fact that a constitution 
                                           
137 Id., para 145. 
138 See Article 1 of the African Charter, for example.   
139 Sloss, “Executing Foster v. Neilson” supra, note 2, p. 304 (arguing that the inquiry by 
municipal courts begins with treaty interpretation and that the second step is to consider 
domestic laws). 
140 Vazquez, “Judicial Enforcement”, supra, note 25, p. 439. 
141 Gráinne de Búrca& Oliver Gerstenberg“The Denationalization of Constitutional Law”, 
47(1) HARV Int’l L J, 243, 247 (noting that “[d]ualism’s inner justification … lies in 
barring a domestic constitutional order from placing itself, in its entirety, in the hands of 
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established as legal norms”). 
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allows direct application does not as well mean that all treaties sought to be 
applied municipally are given a full right of passage. Some monist States may 
simply refuse to publish a given treaty and thus stall its domestic application. 
Conclusion     
The discussion in this article challenges the view that a treaty could be self-
executing in the sense of “accomplish[ing] its aims of its own force”142 under 
any circumstance.  We argue that there is no such authority in a treaty to be 
applicable as municipal law on its own force because treaties are executed by 
municipal law under one or the other of the two observable ways of executing 
treaties within national spheres – monism or dualism. The distinction between 
‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-Executing’ treaties should be understood for what 
it is: a “judicially invented”143 gloss on the United States’ monist Constitution.   
The article has examined when, really, treaties could be said to be self-
executing, assuming it was possible that a treaty could be self-executing. These 
attempts only further revealed the messy state of the doctrine and its 
assumptions. Therefore, it is only through the vehicle of municipal law that 
international law can be “positioned in such a way as to make its ‘safeguards’ 
practical and effective”144 within the national sphere of States. To illuminate this 
argument, attention was drawn to the fact that a dual process is involved in the 
determination of the domestic application of treaties.  
The first process (which is relevant to monist constitutions) involves a 
determination of the suitability of the treaty for domestic enforcement; this is 
discoverable from the language and object of the treaty. The second process of 
how or when the treaty is domestically applicable is a question that is within the 
reserved domain of municipal law, answerable by reference only to the 
particular municipal law involved. The latter process is common to both monist 
and dualist constitutions. Furthermore, it was argued that the relevant municipal 
law consideration should always supersede reliance on “a dubious intent of the 
parties”145 in that intent could not be decisive when some of the parties have 
beforehand expressed in their constitutional law that a treaty is either directly or 
not directly applicable in their legal systems. 
In our final remark, it is fitting to state that the American approach to the 
domestic application of treaties should be cautiously guided when relating it to 
other constitutions in view of the peculiar nature of article VI of the US 
Constitution and the variety US judges and scholars have made of it.              ■ 
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